POLE SHARING BETWEEN THE ELECTRICITY AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTORS
INTRODUCTION
The privatisation of Brazilian telecommunications companies in the late 1990s prompted a reform of the regulatory framework, with an emphasis on competition, reducing barriers to entry, diversifying services, and improving service quality. In this context, infrastructure sharing between electricity distribution utilities and telecommunications service providers became essential to facilitate network expansion, reduce capital expenditure, and extend access to services.
Joint regulation began with Joint Resolution No. 1 of ANEEL, ANATEL, and ANP, dated 24 November 1999. This was followed by Joint Resolution No. 2 of 27 March 2001, which established procedures for resolving disputes between regulated entities. Subsequently, Joint Resolution No. 4 of ANEEL and ANATEL, dated 16 December 2014, established a reference price for pole sharing in the event of disputes and regulated the use of pole attachment points.
Joint Resolution No. 3 of 24 November 2020 re-established the Dispute Resolution Committee comprising the regulatory agencies responsible for the electricity, telecommunications, and petroleum sectors. This institutional framework is important because disputes concerning infrastructure access may involve technical, commercial, contractual, and competition-related issues.
In 2023, Interministerial Ordinance MCOM/MME No. 10,563, dated 25 September, established the National Pole-Sharing Policy, known as Poste Legal. The initiative sought to promote the orderly use of infrastructure, improve coordination between the sectors, and reduce problems arising from unauthorised or non-compliant pole occupancy.
Another significant development was the publication of Decree No. 12,068 of 20 June 2024. Article 16 provides that electricity distribution concessionaires must assign the spaces, occupation zones, and attachment points intended for sharing with the telecommunications sector to a separate legal entity. The decree requires this assignment to be remunerated and cost-oriented, and provides for commercial exploitation through a Reference Offer for Infrastructure Space, in accordance with joint regulations issued by ANEEL and ANATEL.
In December 2025, ANEEL approved a draft joint resolution intended to replace the rules established under Joint Resolution No. 4/2014. However, the text approved by ANEEL differed from the proposal previously approved by ANATEL, particularly regarding whether commercial exploitation had to be transferred to a third party. Consequently, the matter remained subject to joint regulatory deliberation.
As of October 2026, it is therefore necessary to distinguish between the legal requirements established by Decree No. 12,068/2024 and the provisions of the new joint resolution, whose regulatory process had not yet been completed. Joint Resolution No. 4/2014 remains relevant to understanding the existing regulatory framework, including the reference price used in dispute-resolution proceedings.
Improvements to this regulatory framework should promote economic efficiency, operational safety, contractual transparency, competition, and tariff affordability, while distinguishing proposed regulatory policies from obligations that have already been formally established.
THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR AND INFRASTRUCTURE SHARING
Telecommunications encompass the transmission of information through guided and unguided media. Guided media include twisted-pair copper cables, coaxial cables, and optical fibre. Unguided media include terrestrial radio transmission and satellite communications.
Copper pairs transmit electrical signals but are susceptible to attenuation and electromagnetic interference. Coaxial cables provide greater protection against interference and higher transmission capacity than conventional copper pairs. Optical fibre transmits information through pulses of light, offering high capacity, low signal attenuation, and immunity to electromagnetic interference.
Wireless networks use electromagnetic waves propagated through the air or relayed by satellites. Their deployment can reduce the need for physical cabling, although it depends on specific conditions relating to coverage, capacity, spectrum availability, and link quality.
Fixed-network telecommunications services include telephony, broadband, and subscription television. The expansion of these services depends on the availability of suitable infrastructure to carry data between service providers and end users.
Pole sharing allows different telecommunications providers to install cables and equipment on infrastructure originally designed for electricity distribution. This arrangement reduces the need to construct dedicated support structures, facilitates market entry by new competitors, and can lower network deployment costs.
However, the physical capacity of utility poles is limited. Excessive occupancy can compromise required safety clearances, make maintenance more difficult, increase mechanical loading, and raise risks to workers and members of the public. Non-compliant occupancy can also make it difficult to identify cable owners, complicate inspections, and undermine accountability for faults or accidents.
Shared infrastructure is an important input into competition in telecommunications markets, particularly for smaller providers that rely on access to utility poles to expand their networks. Excessively high access charges, delays in contracting, or a lack of information about available attachment points can create barriers to market entry and service expansion.
The density of fixed-line connections and the pressure placed on infrastructure vary across regions, municipalities, and electricity distribution concession areas. Nevertheless, connection density alone does not determine whether infrastructure is congested. The technology deployed, network configuration, number of available attachment points, and physical condition of the poles must also be taken into account.
Geographical heterogeneity therefore requires a regulatory approach that reflects the characteristics of each distribution concession area and its different geographical segments. Uniform procedures may be inadequate when remediation costs, the number of infrastructure users, and infrastructure availability differ substantially between localities.
REGULARISATION OF POLE OCCUPANCY
Addressing the backlog of non-compliant pole occupancy is one of the main challenges facing infrastructure sharing. Earlier studies by ANEEL identified a substantial proportion of poles with occupancy-related problems. In 2025, regulatory discussions again highlighted the scale of the issue, with estimates indicating that approximately 10 million to 15 million poles required priority intervention, representing around 20% to 30% of the total number managed by distribution utilities.
These estimates should be understood as reference figures used in the regulatory process, rather than as the outcome of a definitive census of every non-compliant pole in Brazil. The scale of the problem varies according to the criteria used to classify non-compliance, the availability of asset-register data, and the circumstances of each distribution concession area.
Continued non-compliant occupancy can increase distribution costs, compromise safety, and constrain telecommunications network expansion. However, inspecting every pole across a network comprising tens of millions of poles would require substantial financial, human, and operational resources.
Decree No. 12,068/2024 reinforced the need to organise the commercial exploitation of shared infrastructure through a legal entity separate from the electricity distribution concessionaire. The assignment must be remunerated and cost-oriented, and is subject to joint regulation by the agencies and to applicable technical requirements, including those imposed by the assigning distribution utility.
The draft regulation approved by ANEEL in December 2025 set out mechanisms for regularising priority poles. The proposed provisions included the preparation and annual publication of a Priority Pole Regularisation Plan, identification of poles requiring intervention, removal of redundant or unused cables, compliance with technical standards, and identification of the infrastructure assets used by telecommunications providers.
The proposal established an annual regularisation range of 2% to 3% of the total number of poles managed by the infrastructure operator. This provision formed part of the regulatory text approved by ANEEL, whose implementation remained dependent on completion of the joint rulemaking process. It should therefore not automatically be treated as a binding requirement already in force in every detail.
The proposal also provided for telecommunications providers to identify their occupied attachment points within a specified period following publication of the applicable regulation. Failure to identify assets could result in the removal of unidentified infrastructure, subject to the procedures and safety requirements established by the rules. Since the commencement of any deadline depends on publication of the applicable instrument, deadlines contained in the proposal should not be treated as necessarily having already started to run.
Statistical Sampling and Inspection Planning
In addition to the mechanisms established or proposed by the regulatory agencies, the use of statistical sampling should be considered to support the assessment of non-compliant occupancy, the planning of inspections, and the evaluation of outcomes. Sampling can complement inspections and asset-register surveys, but it does not automatically replace the applicable regulatory obligations to identify, correct, and regularise infrastructure assets.
In stratified sampling, the population is divided into relatively homogeneous groups based on geographical, operational, and socioeconomic characteristics. Drawing a sample from each group makes it possible to estimate the proportion of non-compliant poles at lower cost, provided that the sampling design is appropriate to the analytical objectives.
The sample size required to estimate a proportion in a finite population can be calculated using the following formula:
n = [N × P × (1 − P) × Z²] ÷ [d² × (N − 1) + P × (1 − P) × Z²]
Where:
n = sample size;
N = population size;
P = estimated proportion of non-compliant poles;
Z = critical value associated with the confidence level;
d = permissible margin of error.
For a confidence level of 99%, the critical value Z is approximately 2.576. The probability of error is given by:
α = 1 − confidence level
Therefore, for a confidence level of 99%:
α = 1 − 0.99 = 0.01
Since the confidence interval is two-sided, the critical value corresponding to a cumulative probability of 1 − α/2, or 0.995, is used.
Consider, for example, a population of 1,975,499 poles, with an estimated non-compliance rate of 8%, a confidence level of 99%, and an absolute margin of error of one percentage point.
The values used are:
N = 1,975,499
P = 0.08
1 − P = 0.92
Z = 2.576
d = 0.01
Substituting these values into the formula gives:
n = [1,975,499 × 0.08 × 0.92 × 2.576²] ÷ [0.01² × (1,975,499 − 1) + 0.08 × 0.92 × 2.576²]
The approximate result is:
n ≈ 4,887 poles
This result is based on the assumptions underlying the sampling model. The final sample size should take into account the sampling design, the geographical distribution of poles, possible correlation between nearby units, non-response rates, and the need to produce independent estimates for different regions.
Sampling can help measure progress in regularisation and identify areas with higher rates of non-compliance. However, inspecting a sample does not automatically identify every non-compliant pole. Identified problems must be corrected in accordance with the responsibilities and procedures established by the applicable regulations.
It is recommended that implementation indicators be published periodically and that the data be sufficiently detailed to allow assessment of the performance of distribution utilities, infrastructure operators, and telecommunications providers. Monthly performance reporting appeared in the proposal approved by ANEEL in 2025, although its implementation must be confirmed against the final regulatory text.
Responsibilities for Regularisation and Economic Incentives
Regularisation requires resources for information gathering, inspections, data processing, identification of infrastructure users, and implementation of remedial works. The regulatory framework should clearly allocate responsibility for each activity and specify which party must bear the associated costs.
Under the proposal approved by ANEEL, telecommunications providers would be responsible for regularising the spaces they occupy and for the costs of the adjustments required for compliant infrastructure sharing, subject to the conditions set out in the regulation. The distribution utility or infrastructure operator would be responsible for administration, monitoring, and inspection, without prejudice to the powers and responsibilities of the regulatory agencies.
Decree No. 12,068/2024 requires the assignment of infrastructure space to be remunerated and cost-oriented. This does not mean that any particular charging methodology is automatically authorised. Specific pricing criteria depend on the applicable regulatory framework and relevant regulatory decisions.
One possible improvement would be to assess the efficient costs of regularisation and establish transparent mechanisms for financial monitoring. Forecast costs should be compared with actual expenditure, using defined requirements for supporting evidence, oversight, and regulatory treatment of any differences.
Economic incentives to encourage regularisation could also be considered, provided they are consistent with the rules governing infrastructure remuneration, the allocation of responsibilities, and tariff affordability. Any changes to revenue-sharing arrangements would require a specific regulatory assessment and should not be treated as an automatic consequence of the obligation to regularise poles.
GENERAL OCCUPANCY RULES AND TRANSPARENCY
Measures to address the backlog of non-compliant occupancy should be accompanied by rules designed to prevent new cases from arising. A Reference Offer for Infrastructure Space is a central instrument in this process because it is intended to consolidate the technical and commercial terms required for infrastructure sharing.
The draft regulation approved by ANEEL in 2025 provides for the organisation of the commercial exploitation of utility poles and the establishment of conditions governing access, occupancy, asset identification, and compliance with technical standards. The reference offer should enable telecommunications providers to understand the terms on which infrastructure can be contracted and allow regulators to monitor compliance with the applicable rules.
Transparency is essential to reducing information asymmetries. Published data should make it possible to identify infrastructure users, verify contractual status, and monitor non-compliance, while respecting legally protected information.
In 2025, ANATEL introduced a data-collection requirement concerning pole-sharing agreements as part of its Action Plan to Combat Unfair Competition and Regularise the Provision of Multimedia Communication Services. The reporting obligation applied to Multimedia Communication Service providers using shared poles, regardless of their size, with the deadline subsequently extended to 31 March 2026.
The data collection exercise was intended to update, supplement, and correct ANATEL's records and contribute to the development of a Positive Register of providers compliant with the requirements governing shared infrastructure occupancy. In April 2026, the agency reported that it had received more than 2,000 contracts for review and that some had already been forwarded to ANEEL for the relevant approval procedures.
This initiative demonstrates that regularisation depends on more than the introduction of new technical rules. It also requires improved asset records, identification of contracts, coordination between regulatory agencies, and the capacity to distinguish compliant providers from infrastructure users that do not meet the applicable requirements.
The role of specialised third parties in managing utility poles, referred to here as infrastructure operators, became a central issue in the regulatory debate. Decree No. 12,068/2024 provides for assignment to a separate legal entity. By contrast, the draft regulation approved by ANEEL in December 2025 allowed the distribution utility to opt for assignment under certain conditions and also contemplated circumstances in which assignment would be compulsory.
The disagreement over whether assignment should be mandatory was one of the reasons the proposal had to be reconsidered by ANATEL. In 2026, the agencies were still seeking to resolve the impasse, with the Office of the Attorney General of the Union involved in arbitrating the differences.
It is therefore essential to distinguish the requirement established by the decree from the proposed regulatory provisions. The final model must comply with the legislation in force and reflect the outcome of the joint regulatory process. It should not be assumed that every detail of the proposal approved by one agency has already entered into force.
The involvement of third-party operators may provide specialist expertise, standardised procedures, and greater administrative efficiency. However, it may also introduce intermediation costs, concentration risks, and additional monitoring challenges. The model should establish clear responsibilities, oversight mechanisms, selection criteria, remuneration arrangements, and procedures for remedying service failures.
PRICING FOR POLE ATTACHMENT POINTS
The price charged for sharing utility poles should reflect infrastructure costs, an appropriate return on capital, regional conditions, and incentives for competition. Joint Resolution No. 4/2014 established a reference price for use in dispute-resolution proceedings without eliminating the possibility of commercial negotiation between the parties.
Decree No. 12,068/2024 requires the assignment of infrastructure space to be remunerated and cost-oriented. Cost orientation is intended to prevent prices from being arbitrarily high or disconnected from the relevant infrastructure costs, while allowing the resources employed to be remunerated appropriately.
In December 2025, ANEEL stated that the determination of regulated prices would be addressed in a second phase of Public Consultation No. 73/2021, following publication of the joint resolution. Under the regulatory framework described by official sources consulted through October 2026, the pricing methodology therefore remained a regulatory matter awaiting completion.
Until the applicable new instrument is adopted, it should not be assumed that a new price schedule or methodology has automatically replaced the previous framework. The reference price established under Joint Resolution No. 4/2014 remains relevant to understanding the existing regime and the commercial disputes arising under it.
It is recommended that the pricing methodology take account of the efficient costs of infrastructure, the number of attachment points, the characteristics of occupancy, and the conditions under which the service is provided. It should also assess the effects on smaller providers entering the market, competition, and network expansion.
One possible improvement would be to consider price bands based on the number of contracted attachment points, provided that the differentiation is supported by verifiable economic evidence. An illustrative structure would be:
If 1 ≤ q ≤ 200, then p(q) = p₁.
If 201 ≤ q ≤ 40,000, then p(q) = p₂.
If q > 40,000, then p(q) = p₃.
Where:
q = number of contracted attachment points;
p(q) = applicable unit price;
p₁ = unit price applicable to the first band;
p₂ = unit price applicable to the second band;
p₃ = unit price applicable to the third band.
These thresholds are illustrative only and should not be interpreted as price bands formally approved by ANEEL or ANATEL. Adopting such a structure would require cost assessment, regulatory impact analysis, and formal approval by the competent authority.
Price indexation must comply with the applicable rules and valid contractual terms. Adjustment, review, and dispute-resolution mechanisms should be transparent, predictable, and consistent with the regulatory framework in force.
Asymmetric measures could also be considered for localities with specific socioeconomic or competitive characteristics. For this purpose, an Economic Vulnerability Index could be developed by combining indicators of income, inequality, coverage, access density, and infrastructure availability.
The Gini coefficient, for example, ranges from zero to one:
0 ≤ G ≤ 1
Values close to zero indicate lower inequality, while values close to one indicate higher inequality. However, income inequality alone does not demonstrate a lack of competition or inadequate coverage.
Once the index has been constructed and validated, municipalities could be classified by quantiles. For example, the upper quintile would comprise localities with index values above the 80th percentile:
IVEᵢ > Q₀,₈₀
Where:
IVEᵢ = vulnerability index for municipality i;
Q₀,₈₀ = quantile corresponding to the 80th percentile of the distribution.
This classification would constitute a proposed analytical tool only. It is not an eligibility criterion already established under the regulations governing pole sharing. Any tariff differentiation based on such an index would require an economic justification, objective criteria, an assessment of competitive effects, and regulatory approval.
Any reduction in the share of revenues allocated to consumers, where such revenue-sharing arrangements apply, would also require a specific assessment of the effects on tariff affordability, incentives for infrastructure expansion, and the distribution of benefits between consumers and concessionaires.
INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING
International experience shows that infrastructure sharing can take different institutional and commercial forms. Models vary according to market structure, regulatory powers, asset ownership, and the mechanisms used to resolve disputes.
In the United States, pole attachment agreements allow telecommunications providers to access electricity distribution infrastructure. Federal and state regulation may establish access conditions and dispute-resolution criteria, while commercial negotiation remains important in many circumstances.
In Argentina, infrastructure sharing is subject to technical feasibility conditions and applicable access rules. Commercial terms are negotiated between the parties, subject to the relevant regulatory provisions.
In Colombia, the regulatory framework establishes sharing obligations under specified conditions and provides mechanisms for determining prices when the parties cannot reach a commercial agreement.
In Mexico, passive infrastructure is also subject to specific access rules. Regulatory intervention and infrastructure information systems can help improve transparency regarding asset location, capacity, and conditions of use.
These experiences indicate that no single international model is suitable for every circumstance. Regulatory design should reflect institutional arrangements, competitive conditions, operating costs, and local characteristics.
In Brazil, Decree No. 12,068/2024 introduced an explicit requirement for the remunerated, cost-oriented assignment of shared infrastructure to a separate legal entity. The joint regulatory framework must reconcile this requirement with electrical safety, orderly pole occupancy, competition in the telecommunications sector, and the economic viability of commercial exploitation.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Improving pole sharing requires a combination of technical safety, economic efficiency, transparency, and appropriate incentives. Decree No. 12,068/2024 is a significant regulatory milestone because it provides for the remunerated, cost-oriented assignment of shared infrastructure to a separate legal entity.
However, the practical implementation of this requirement depends on ensuring consistency between the decree and the joint regulations issued by ANEEL and ANATEL. The proposal approved by ANEEL in December 2025 addressed commercial exploitation, the regularisation of priority poles, asset identification, and the future pricing methodology. Nevertheless, disagreements between the agencies meant that these elements could not all be treated as definitively binding requirements.
Addressing the backlog of non-compliant occupancy should prioritise the most critical areas and combine asset-identification requirements, planning, inspections, and corrective action. Statistical sampling can support diagnosis and performance monitoring, but it does not replace regulatory regularisation obligations or guarantee that every non-compliant pole will be individually identified.
ANATEL's contract-collection initiative and the development of a Positive Register represent progress in organising information and identifying providers that use shared infrastructure. Data sharing between agencies, contractual transparency, and coordinated enforcement are essential to reducing non-compliant occupancy and improving accountability among market participants.
With respect to pricing, the methodology should be cost-oriented and consistent with the regulatory framework in force. Proposals for price bands or asymmetric measures may be considered, but they must be supported by evidence of efficient costs, objective criteria, and regulatory impact assessment. They should not be presented as official requirements before formal approval.
In summary, regulation should balance the interests of electricity distribution utilities, infrastructure operators, telecommunications providers, and consumers. The ultimate objective is to ensure infrastructure that is safe, appropriately remunerated, accessible on transparent terms, and capable of supporting the expansion of electricity and telecommunications services.
